1.1 Background, issues, methods

1.1.1 Background to the evaluation
Upon a proposal made by the Industry Ministry, the cabinet evaluation committee (CIME) undertook to assess the energy management policy pursued in France since the first oil crisis.
This policy has aimed to:

• hold down energy consumption, specifically in order to reduce the country's energy bill;
• shift consumption to forms of energy that are less costly in terms of foreign exchange and above all less likely than oil or gas to suffer interruption of supply.

It was decided to undertake an evaluation in light of the following observations:

• while energy consumption fell slightly in industry between 1973 and 1993 (-9%), sharp increases have been observed in transport (+48%) and the residential/commercial sector (+43%);
• the rate of energy conservation has fallen off sharply since 1986, and energy consumption per point of GDP has even been rising since 1991;
• the commitments made at the Rio conference (June 1992) require us to firmly manage carbon dioxide emissions, i.e. our consumption of fossil energy, whereas the easiest-to-implement energy savings have already been exploited.

To guide the public authorities in exploiting the remaining untapped energy savings, which will require more finely honed instruments than those used so far, it was necessary for the evaluation process to:

• "identify the role of prices in savings realised in the past;
• measure the effect on energy consumption of the principle tools implemented;
• evaluate the synergy and consistency of the instruments of public intervention;
• contribute to the definition of instruments for the evaluation of energy efficiency in order to orient government decision-making."

Lastly it should be remarked that the French Agency for Environment and Energy Management (ADEME) is committed to developing internal evaluation instruments and this evaluation has provided an opportunity to initiate the process.

1.1.2 Main problems encountered
The committee became aware of four main problems from the outset.
"Energy management policy" encompasses a broad range of actions, that differ in their principles, objectives, operational aspects and effects, and are intended to reach a great many actors in all sectors of the economy. A sampling of actions must be selected for assessment, as was underscored by the evaluation's scientific council prior to the launching of the present evaluation. The committee has defined energy management actions as "positive action labelled as aiming to reduce energy consumption".

• In a certain number of areas, particularly housing, city planning and transportation, public policies drawn up completely independently of any concern for energy conservation have had a strong and often decisive impact on the amount of energy consumed. These policies could not be assessed as energy management measures.
• Wide fluctuation in energy prices had significant repercussions on decentralised decision-making concerning energy consumption: the magnitude of public action for energy management varied along with prices, making it very difficult to distinguish the consequences due to these policies and the "price effect", respectively.
• The evaluation covers a long period that starts with the first oil crisis. The evaluation committee found itself grappling with the absence of administrative memory which makes it hard to reconstitute the history of the policy to be evaluated: difficulty in reconstituting what amounts of public funds were devoted to energy management, as they were in most cases included in broader budgetary envelopes; disappearance of written documents describing the motives behind the measures taken. Likewise, it was not easy to obtain first-hand testimony from the beneficiaries of the oldest aid measures.

The committee also felt that evaluation of policy for research and development in the field of energy management was not within its purview. Research policy evaluation falls to the National Committee for Research Evaluation (CNER).

1.1.3 Working procedure and methods
The committee created six focus groups made up of certain of its members joined by experts from government, representatives of the bodies involved, and academics:

• one group devoted to a global economic approach to energy management policy;
• three sectoral groups: industry, transportation, residential/commercial;
• two topical groups: renewable energies, district heating.

Guided by a group leader, each of these groups was assigned to propose a sampling of actions to be evaluated in its domain, identify the questions to be raised, and suggest suitable methods (outline of the terms of reference for the evaluation process).
The focus groups used a battery of criteria to select the actions to be evaluated, including:

• the amount of energy consumed by the target area for each action, the time distribution of this consumption, and the magnitude of potential energy savings;
• the volume of public spending devoted to the action;
• the current relevance of the action: some actions are too old to allow meaningful evaluation today, others are too recent. It seemed preferable to evaluate only actions undertaken at least four years ago, and to eliminate those that have been suspended for ten years or more.

Prior to this selection process a document had been drawn up by the renewable energies and rational energy use department of the Energy and Raw Materials division at the Industry Ministry, and by the Prospective Studies and Evaluation division at ADEME. This document, attached as annex 6, included a nomenclature of energy management instruments and a quantification of selection criteria.
Each of the group leaders presented his or her group's proposals for each of the headings of this nomenclature to the evaluation committee meeting in plenary session. Following in-depth discussion, the proposals which had been chosen were presented to the scientific council, which approved the selection. The focus groups then refined the terms of reference for the different evaluation processes to be conducted: some assessments were carried out by civil servants designated by various inspectorates, others were opened to tender for the selection of consulting firms.
We have tried wherever possible to gauge the cost-effectiveness for the community of the actions evaluated; in all instances an effort has been made to quantitatively establish public spending for each action, measured in terms of toe/year in savings that were fostered, if not directly caused, by the action in question.
The following list outlines the work undertaken:
Global economic study

• Energy efficiency indicators, international comparisons: consulting firm ENERDATA SA
• Explanatory factors and induced macro-economic effects: Laboratoire de l'Ecole Centrale

Industry

• Periodic expert analysis and prior consulting: Conseil général des Mines (Mr Arlette, Mr Moiroud)
• ADEME demonstration projects: consulting firm Central Management International, in liaison with the Institut Français de l'Energie
• ADEME decision-making assistance: consulting firm IREQ supervised by Ms Moulet (Inspection Générale de l'Industrie et du Commerce)
• Fiscal measures: Inspection Générale des Finances (Mr Pagezy, Mr Coustet)
• Boiler efficiency: consulting firms CETIAT and GAPAVE, supervised by Mr Petit (Conseil Général des Mines).

Transportation: Conseil General des Ponts et Chaussees (Mr Orselli)
Residential/commercial

• Drawing up of thermal regulations for housing construction: consulting firms Paziaud SA and Bernard, supervised by Mr Orselli
• Government oversight: Conseil Général des Ponts et Chaussees (Mr Uliviéri)
• Thermal regulations for commercial construction: consulting firm TRIBU supervised by Mr Ulivieri
• Fiscal incentives linked to personal income tax: Inspection Générale des Finances (Mr Lidsky), and analysis of a sampling of tax returns carried out by the consulting firm SCORE supervised by Mr Orselli
• Measures in state buildings: Inspection Générale des Finances (Mr Sichel)

Renewable and alternative energies

• International comparison of policies pursued in different countries: consulting firm DRI supervised by Mr Bal (ADEME)
• Steps taken in the wood industry: Conseil General du GREF (Mr Rimkine, Mr Becker)
• Geothermal energy: Conseil Général des Mines (Mr Legrand)

District heating: Conseil General des Mines (Mr Legrand)

1.2 Summary

1.2.1 Global economic assessment
Before attempting an evaluation of the actions listed above, the following global issues can be introduced.

1.2.1.1 How much public spending?
Public spending for energy management policy is hard to quantify. While some spending is clearly identifiable (budgets attributed to the energy management agency), the largest costs cannot be isolated, notably in housing, where aid for the rehabilitation of public housing rental units, subsidies administered by the national housing improvement agency (private-sector rental units) and tax reductions for owner-occupants can be applied to energy conservation, but also to major repairs, without any accounting record that allows energy management spending to be separated out. The following table is based on estimates of the proportion of these subsidies that is applied to improvements that involve energy use (and not necessarily having energy conservation as their goal). But a large fraction of this spending, for new windows, rehabilitation of facades or roof repairs for instance, does not involve only energy concerns, or are inherently independent of any energy management concern (replacement of a non-functioning boiler, for example). The share of the subsidy which can be attributed to energy management is undoubtedly much lower than the amounts shown in the "subsidies for improvements involving energy use"; this difference cannot be precisely calculated but for the period since 1986 it is in all likelihood less than half of the figures listed.
With the above-mentioned reservations, trends in public spending for energy management policy have evolved as follows (in millions of 1994 francs), broken down into major categories.

Public Spending for Energy Management Policy(millions of 1994 francs)

Energy Management Agency budget				Subsidies for improvements involving energy use in housing
Year	Programme spending	Research	Total	Aid and subsidies	Income tax reductions	Total
1974	0	0		0	0	0
1975	132	0	132	0	564	564
1976	473	0	473	0	564	564
1977	447	0	447	0	571	571
1978	494	0	494	0	558	558
1979	1 541	202	1 743	0	605	605
1980	1 378	257	1 635	89	384	473
1981	1 255	308	1 563	177	452	629
1982	1 100	318	1 418	1 083	943	2 449
1983	2 760	469	3 229	1 373	1 424	2 797
1984	3 128	374	3 502	1 973	1 081	3 054
1985	1 637	358	1 995	2 407	979	3 886
1986	963	289	1 252	2 608	1 401	4 009
1987	639	195	834	1 604	1 489	3 093
1988	410	172	582	1 645	164	1 809
1989	348	158	506	1 305	194	1 499
1990	446	218	664	1 538	299	1 837
1991	397	176	573	1 541	420	2 040
1992	372	198	570	1 711	499	2 210
1993	194	193	387	1 746	563	2 309
Total	18 114	3 885	21 999	20 800	13 154	33 954

ublic spending that can be attributed to energy management for this period amounted on average to roughly 1% of the country's energy expenditure.¹
We show in a single graph (below) the evolution of the energy agency budget and subsidies for housing (in millions of 1994 francs), and the price trends of oil imported in France (in 1994 francs per tonne).

• heavy fuel oil that was taxed at 75 F/t from 1982, and at 370 F/t as of 1st January 1986, was taxed at only 150 F/t in 1988;
• the tax on home heating oil went from 105 F/hl in 1985 to 78 F/hl in 1992;
• the tax on diesel fuel for professional use (exclusive of deductible VAT) fell from 240 F/hl in 1979 to 175 F/hl in 1992.

We find it regrettable that fiscal policy accentuated the price fluctuations, and wonder whether public action might not have been more effective, for identical overall spending over the period 1973-1993, if subsidies had been more constant and had extended over longer times (a part of the investment aid for the period 1973-1986 having been transferred in the form of aid for demonstration projects and decision-making assistance after 1986).
In any event it is certain that many of those who invested in the renewable energy industry between 1983 and 1986 (the period during which public incentive action was greatest), either to achieve energy savings for themselves or to produce energy-efficient equipment, were liable to feel betrayed by the fact that public action ceased with the ebb of oil prices.
The contrast must be stressed between, on the one hand, the highly persistent continuity of public efforts, recognised as necessary for the development of nuclear power, and the private-sector investment of major fossil energy producers, and on the other hand the fluctuating nature of public backing for energy management. The public authorities reacted in the short term to hasten the return to a comfortable trade balance, which had been jeopardised by the oil bill, without truly seeking to establish a better long-term equilibrium, that accurately reflected the cost of rare resources, between investment to develop energy supply and investment intended to optimise demand.

1.2.1.3 Energy savings: what was really achieved?
Under the combined effects of a temporary rise in energy prices and of government action, our country achieved "energy savings"; some were only short-lived behavioural savings, others were more long-lived because based on investments.
Savings cannot be easily quantified. This quantification is based on a convention (see chapter 2.1). Measuring energy savings realised between 1973 and a later year assumes that a reference scenario is chosen, to which actual events are compared. "Energy savings" are the difference between energy consumption in the reference scenario and the observed energy consumption.
The choice of reference scenario involves classifying in two groups the factors which have an impact on energy consumption:

• factors which are the target of voluntary energy conservation measures;
• so-called "market-linked" factors which are considered to be beyond the range of public action.

The reference scenario assumes that the measures in the first group are not taken. Energy savings measured in this way do not take into account the fact that increases in consumption occurred because of trends in factors, purportedly "market-linked", which government action had been unable or unwilling to influence, while these trends were indeed largely dependent on public policy in various areas.
In this analytic framework it is considered that energy savings were achieved in transportation because the unit consumption of certain vehicles was lowered, even though motor fuel consumption rose by half between 1973 and 1993, spurred by economic growth, but also by the effects of public policies pursued in urban planning, transport infrastructure and taxation of road users, independently of any energy considerations.
With the preceding reservations in mind, tempering the concept of quantity applied to energy savings, energy savings can be estimated at 33 Mtoe/year between 1973 and 1993, at which time final energy consumption in France amounted to 141 Mtoe/year.
More importantly than the concept of energy savings, it seems useful to:

• follow the impact of each targeted energy management policy using indicators in the form of unit consumption (e.g. heating consumption per m2 in multi-family housing);
• characterise the overall performance of a country by its energy intensity corrected for trade effects (see chapter 2.1).

1.2.1.4 International comparisons
The committee sought to compare the effectiveness of the policies pursued by various countries (United States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom and the Netherlands), by examining the evolution in energy intensity for each country respectively. Knowing that all of these countries had been subject to the "price effect" of the oil crises, the observed differences in performance could hopefully be attributed to varying degrees of effectiveness in public energy management policy. This comparison was less instructive than the committee had hoped, first because the "price effect" linked to the oil crises was rather different from one country to another (due to different prices for local coal and natural gas, and different fiscal treatment of motor fuels), and secondly due to the problems encountered in gathering comparable information for the 1973-1993 period for all of these countries.
The comparison suggests that France is well placed among the countries studied, but also that this position is in large part due to the gains in final energy yield that are automatically obtained when electricity is substituted for fossil fuels, a shift which occurred on a very large scale with the nuclear power programme, and which is independent of energy management policy.

1.2.1.5 Econometrics, windfall gains and macro-economic impact
An attempt was also made, in the context of econometric research, to see whether the factor of public spending for energy management, along with the price effect, contributed significantly to explaining the observed energy savings (see chapter 2.2). The answer is positive, but this approach remains fragile.
A model was also drawn up, to try and isolate the macro-economic impact of public spending on energy management on employment, growth and the foreign trade balance. Like the above-mentioned exercises, this work was an interesting attempt, but its conclusions are dependent on the relatively fragile hypotheses of knock-on effects (number of francs of investment triggered by 1 franc of public aid) on which they are based. These results suggest that from 1976 to 1992 public energy management policy could indeed have had a positive effect on GDP and employment.

1.2.1.6 Energy statistics (annex no. 9)
The work undertaken here has shown that it is important to have statistics that are suited to an evaluation; our statistical apparatus should in the future be increasingly designed with this perspective in mind. It must be stressed that energy statistics gathered in France are fairly sturdy, compared to those of other countries, but could be improved to acquire better knowledge of trends in renewable and alternative energy use, for one, and also of trends in demand for motor fuels (who uses which fuels, where?). Lastly, we must be very watchful that the current deregulation of the energy supply industry does not perturb our statistical apparatus.

1.2.2 Decision-making assistance
One major theme of government action was to facilitate the identification of economically feasible energy conservation opportunities, at a time when our society, which had forgotten how to get the most out of energy use, was caught off guard by the oil crises. After the oil crisis this continues to be the most legitimate public mission in the area of energy management: the threat of shortages has receded and for the vast majority of businesses and consumers energy has once again become an expenditure that is so small in terms of cost price or consumption budget that they are no longer spontaneously inclined to seek out the information needed to make the appropriate decisions.
Public policy in this domain has taken on three dimensions:

• regulations requiring large energy consumers to hire certified organisations for periodic assessment of the conditions surrounding their energy use;
• subsidies granted for studies commissioned from outside consultants;
• direct information dissemination by the energy agency and agency support for local partners.

The evaluation focused on the first of these aspects, on grants for industry studies and on some of the transport information disseminated by the agency. The study commissioned by the evaluation committee has yielded a positive conclusion regarding the work done.
The current budget in this area is low, amounting to only 10 million francs, compared to 146 million francs in 1985.
It is particularly regrettable that the government no longer takes the lead in keeping up a dialogue between large consumers, certified experts and the administration in the context of the regulatory procedure requiring periodic assessments (chapter 3.1).
Decision-making assistance, along with the regulatory procedure, had contributed to the development of a body of professional consultants qualified to help SMEs, government administrations and households save energy. The abandonment of the regulatory procedure and the collapse of spending for decision-making assistance have amplified the impact of the oil price drop, whereas steps should have been taken to mitigate the demotivating effect. This professional body is now rapidly shrinking.
The procedure for decision-making assistance in industry (chapter 3.3) had been well implemented by the agency, and had turned out to be cost-effective for the community. It can however be regretted that the agency did not systematically monitor these operations, by analysing (even succinctly) the reports submitted by consultants, with the twin aims of determining:

• the potential energy savings thus uncovered, their payback times, and the action taken;
• the quality of the consultants' work.

The same remark has been made about the audits subsidised by the agency in state buildings (chapter 5.6). We cannot emphasise enough the advisability of restoring a minimum stable budget for decision-making assistance, in order to foster and then maintain an effective expertise capacity in consulting firms which can cost-effectively substitute local know-how for imported energy.
The dissemination of printed matter and awareness-raising actions conducted by the agency in the area of transportation (chapter 4) are also deemed to be particularly timely, and rather well done with extremely modest resources compared to those used by equipment manufacturers and transport service providers.

1.2.3 Action regarding energy-efficient equipment
The committee evaluated on the one hand the procedure for granting assistance to demonstration projects in industry to which the agency devoted 850 million francs (1995 francs) from 1975 to 1992, and on the other hand the regulatory measures applicable to boiler efficiency and thermal performance in residential and commercial buildings. The committee also looked at subsidies for research and development devoted to automobiles.

1.2.3.1 Assistance for demonstration projects
This was a significant action in terms of duration (chapter 3.2). The evaluation covered only the steps taken after 1986, i.e. technologies conceived in the wake of the oil crises, but whose dissemination was hampered by the return to low prices. Despite the unfavourable circumstances, this scheme has performed honourably. It should be noted however that it could have been more effective if the agency had had a more perspicacious strategy enabling it to:

• make a better choice of beneficiary for aid in each case, within the triptych formed by the manufacturer, the engineer and the user;
• study potential markets more thoroughly;
• follow up more closely on the dissemination obtained.

Regarding this scheme, the committee would like to emphasise the extent to which the agency, conceived as a goals-oriented body, was seriously thrown off balance by the about-faces in government orientation. The actions evaluated were launched in keeping with the dynamics of aid for investment (under the special funding of the Fonds Special des Grands Travaux, FSGT) designed to procure the greatest energy savings possible in the short term, and not to efficiently prepare for the medium and long-term future. The 1987 downsizing which cut the agency's staff by 30% was a sign of the drastic reduction in the government's ambition, and inevitably perturbed the administration of such a scheme.

1.2.3.2 Boilers and buildings: two areas in which the state sought to take regulatory action to improve the energy efficiency of equipment on the market
Regulations that required a minimum level of efficiency for boilers, instead of establishing mandatory performance information are a striking failure (chapter 3.5).
The boiler market, like those of all types of equipment, was imperfect: lack of performance information expressed in comparable terms, heterogeneous performances levels unrelated to price.
Boilers are the only type of equipment involving energy use where an attempt has been made to eliminate the least efficient models (this has not been done for automobiles or for electric appliances). The committee feels that this approach could have been effective, but observes that efficiency level instituted in 1975 was too low, and was not raised later as made possible by technical progress. The efficiency of equipment marketed was, as early as 1975, much higher than required by the regulations, and rose quite significantly as time went by. The regulations served no purpose, because they were not stringent enough, whereas they could have driven a move to broader use of the most efficient equipment and spurred technical progress. Inversely, it appears that the optional quality label of "high energy performance" created in 1982 in the housing sector acted as an effective stimulant for boiler manufacturers. We must regret that mandatory information requirements were not instituted to inform purchasers of boilers as to the actual energy efficiency of the products under various standard operating conditions, and of performance sensitivity to installation conditions, manual settings and upkeep. It must also be underscored that the NF label for gas has remained opaque, classifying products in a binary fashion (either good or bad), with criteria for obtaining the label that are not selective enough, and without highlighting clear information that could have encouraged competition between manufacturers, and thus stimulated technical progress.
The regulatory action consistently developed from 1975 to 1988 to improve energy efficiency in new buildings is, unlike the case of boilers, an example of successful regulatory action that had a marked and cost-effective energy impact (chapters 5.2 and 5.3).
Nonetheless:

• the regulatory requirements have not been reviewed since 1988, despite the technical advances which have been validated since then, and France, which was a front-runner in 1988 has now been surpassed by several neighbouring countries;
• an unwarranted gap subsists between the requirements posted for housing and those (lesser) that apply to the commercial and institutional sectors;
• above all, the oversight and enforcement of this body of regulations is entirely inadequate.

Careful assessment of the regulations applicable to housing since 1989 leads us to suggest several directions for improvement. These regulations were designed to impose a minimum overall performance level while leaving the choice of means up to the building owner, so as not to hamper innovation. The regulations first sought to establish what overall performance level it was appropriate to aim for, given the hypotheses for energy prices, the costs of various feasible techniques, and the desired temperature. It now appears that none of these three parameters has evolved as projected, and that it is useless to spend too much time trying to set an optimum objective.
Instead it is suggested that all-purpose solutions be proposed, that could be waived if it is demonstrated that an alternative solution does indeed provide overall efficiency that is at least equivalent (demonstration based on calculations using the appropriate quantitative tools), and that the requisite precautions are indeed applied during implementation, if this is a delicate operation. The typical solutions retained should be easily modifiable to incorporate technical variants with satisfactory payback times, each time they arise. Thus today low-emissivity double-paned window glass should be used across the board, and exterior cladding for insulation should be given a strong preference.
This kind of approach would introduce a regulatory pressure that does not exist at present in the renovation of existing buildings, by requiring builders to opt for certain kinds of materials when elements are replaced: low-emissivity double-paned window glass and minimum thermal qualities for window frames when windows are replaced, as is the case in Germany.
The committee has stressed that the priority that is given today to limiting construction costs has unfortunately precluded any amendment of regulations, even when the higher investment cost would lead to lower overall usage cost for the housing unit. This prime concern focused on holding down investment costs is tied to a policy that aims to make homeowners out of households that in some instances do not have sufficient income. A large proportion (over 2/3) of these households do not follow the rules of insulation when building a single-family house for their own account, at the risk of incurring serious difficulties in paying their energy bills later. The state ensures practically no control over this category of construction.
The committee considers the almost total absence of enforcement of thermal regulations to be particularly regrettable, and notes that substantial progress could be made in terms of energy, if the infrastructure and transport administrations acquired a sense of oversight. The problems related to road transport of goods come on top of those raised by building regulations.
The committee recommends that a simplified procedure of systematic verification be instituted and applied to the construction of single-family homes that are financed with state aid earmarked for acquisition of housing (the "Qualitel" label is required to qualify for advantageous financing in the publicly subsidised rental housing market).
Assessment of application of regulations in the commercial/institutional sector (chapter 5.3) has shown that, in light of the levels currently attained in common practice, the maximum allowable heat loss for walls should be lowered by 20% to 25% compared to the level currently set for gas-heated buildings. Furthermore, there is undoubtedly no reason to differentiate between the kind of energy used for heating when setting heat loss requirements. In contrast, regulatory standards for equipment installations appear to be fully applied in only 5% of cases. While some requirements may not be necessary (metering), various shortfalls with major consequences for energy consumption have been reported: in more than half of the cases inadequate ventilation was likely to raise energy consumption by one-third. These failings are all the more regrettable that they are the result, not of a desire to save on investment costs, but of poor understanding or careless application of regulatory standards. This demonstrates that verification would be useful, not only during construction, but certainly in the course of use as well, given the backsliding observed in equipment operation. Proper mastery of fresh air inputs is particularly important in order to conjugate energy management and air quality in inhabited spaces. All in all the very wide range of overall quality observed in equipment installations shows how much is possible in terms of energy gains, with a little more thoughtfulness in design, carefulness in execution and attentiveness in operation.
Mandatory display of rated consumption, which is a more flexible formula for expanding the choices offered in the buildings market, has not been adopted, and it does not appear possible to recommend this approach, given the vastly different conditions of actual use.

1.2.3.3 Automobiles
This domain provides an illustration of an entirely different problem (chapter 4). Significant public funding accompanied manufacturers' efforts to develop highly energy-efficient prototypes, but these results were little or not at all implemented, or were rapidly countered by customers' tastes for more comfortable vehicles. They were also largely contradicted by steps taken by public authorities (at the European Community level) in the name of policies to fight against localised pollution in towns and cities, and in the name of improving passive safety in vehicles. One has to wonder whether the rules enacted in these two areas really took into account the impact they would have on energy consumption, and whether other solutions for reducing pollution and improving safety- regulating car use in urban areas and speed limits- were not mistakenly neglected, solutions that would have also yielded gains in energy consumption.

1.2.4 Investment aid
Investment aid granted for the modification of existing installations constitutes the largest cost in public energy management policy.

1.2.4.1 Industry
In the industrial sector, an interesting procedure was implemented from 1978 to 1981, consisting of a flat-sum grant of 400 francs per toe conserved per year (equivalent to roughly 900 F/toe/yr in 1994 francs). This form of aid optimised the impact of public assistance. It was not possible to evaluate direct aid, which ended too long ago (1986 or 1987), so only the fiscal measures currently subsisting on a more modest scale have been assessed (SOFERGIE funds and accelerated depreciation, chapter 3.4).
The SOFERGIE formula was created in 1980 to facilitate lease financing for investment in energy management, with the hope that this funding would give structure to a body of "third-party investors" who would detect, analyse, carry out and finance investment in "turn-key" energy conservation projects remunerated out of the resulting savings. The role of SOFERGIE funding has ultimately been very small, and the modest tax advantages of this formula have not yielded any discernible advantage in relation to the cost of the funding offered. Maintaining this formula does not appear to be justified.
Since 1977 investment in energy management has been eligible for accelerated depreciation (depreciation over 12 months since 1991). This is equivalent to a subsidy of 2% to 5%, depending on the useful life of the installation. It was not possible to further specify the impact of this very modest aid. It can nonetheless give manufacturers of eligible equipment an additional selling point, and eliminating the favourable depreciation rate could be construed as a sign symbolising the state's lack of interest in energy management.
Various compensation funds have been set up with public money over the period in question. These include guarantees related to the price difference between coal and oil, to geological hazards related to geothermal energy, to steady supplies of wood, and to solar hot water heater performance. The committee had planned to draw up a comparison between the cost-effectiveness of the investment aid procedure (x% of subsidies, or y F/toe/yr saved) and that of a compensation fund backing energy prices (or the price difference between two types of energy, if one is substituted for the other) over the payback time projected for a given investment. It would seem that a major impediment to investment lies in the fact that energy users do not feel capable of speculating on energy prices, which they know to be volatile. In the event of another oil crisis, it might be preferable to support the creation of compensation funds, in ways to be defined, rather than offering investment aid as was done between 1975 and 1986. This assessment was not carried out because the assigned rapporteur was not able to complete the task.

1.2.4.2 Housing
Very significant amounts of aid have been granted for housing, and this aid continues today, targeting a fairly broad range of objectives, among which is found energy conservation. Aid has been attributed in three different ways, in the public housing sector, for private-sector rental housing and to owner-occupants.
Major rehabilitation has been undertaken in public housing (chapter 5.4), with the aim of boosting its image, improving comfort levels and lowering tenants' costs.
This action has been conducted in the framework of an incentive payment (PALULOS) instituted in 1977 for improvement of rental and public housing units.2 The 20% subsidy covers all desirable improvements, and not just energy-related ones, up to a cap on the total cost of improvement work which has steadily increased in constant francs, reaching 85,000 francs/housing unit in 1992. Energy management improvements were given priority from 1983 to 1986, with a rate of subsidy doubled to attain 40%. For the period covered by the FSGT, from 1983 to 1986, the subsidies granted for energy improvements can be estimated at 1.5 billion francs annually (1994 francs). The subsidies fell off considerably after this, to annual levels on the order of 90 million francs (1994 francs). Roughly half of these budget amounts can undoubtedly be attributed to a desire to conserve energy.

1.2.4.3 State buildings
For state buildings (chapter 5.6) the committee has noted that the government is far from having succeeded in establishing policies to detect and realise cost-effective investment in energy, due to the distinction made between investment budgets and operating budgets for one thing, and to the fact that the implementation decisions for these budgets are made at different echelons. The committee suggests that optimising the energy expenditure in state buildings be made the priority objective of ADEME. This process should be backed by very widespread utilisation of leasing mechanisms, and even by the creation of an investment-finance fund that would draw its remuneration from the energy savings realised. It is important that the state set an example in this domain, and that the agency show the government administrations involved that cost-effective energy savings exist even when energy prices are low.
For the construction of new buildings, it would undoubtedly have been advisable to introduce in the rules of public tenders, the obligation to select the bid with the lowest overall cost (up-front investment plus operating costs) rather than the lowest bid in terms of investment costs alone.

1.2.5 Transportation (chapter 4)
Public action earmarked "energy management" in transportation has for all practical purposes applied only to the energy efficiency of road transport vehicles. This technician's approach has been less fruitful than in industry or in building heating, because it is much harder to obtain efficiency gains for a moving vehicle than for stationary installations. We must observe that public energy management policy makers have not paid sufficient attention to ways to incorporate energy conservation in various policies that have a significant impact on transport demand and on the distribution of this demand among different forms of transport.
The committee was unable to assess policies in the areas of urban planning, homeownership incentives, "trade-related urban planning", land use and infrastructure planning, transport infrastructure and fiscal measures, all of which have a major impact on fuel consumption in transportation. The committee can only remark that the policies pursued in these areas have often had the effect of increasing energy consumption in transport, and we recommend that energy management policy makers pay greater attention to the search for opportunities that can influence these various policies and orient them in ways that reconcile the specific policy goals with reduced fuel consumption and the concern for economic effectiveness. This is particularly true for tax issues: specific taxation of road users fell by 18%, per unit of energy consumed, between 1988 and 1993, thus spurring an increased demand for road transport. This specific tax pressure should have on the contrary been augmented so that road users incur all the costs that they engender.

1.2.6 Renewable energy (chapter 6)
Renewable energy has a small place in the energy management action of the French government, and the measures enacted have been hampered by the great efficiency of the French electricity industry and by the tariff rules that are imposed on it (chapter 6.1).
Fuelwood (chapter 6.2) has managed to conserve a significant position in France (8 to 9 Mtoe/yr). In the past fuelwood was targeted by a mostly ineffective campaign to promote wood-fired heating in community and institutional installations. Thanks to the criticism formulated by the present evaluation survey, starting in 1994, past errors have been corrected (primarily the oversizing of installations), and the recent revival of public action in this area, in the form of investment aid under the Fuelwood Plan launched in 1994, appears promising.
A new market is emerging for individual wood-fired installations for back-up heating, particularly in conjunction with electric heat. All told 60% of single-family homes built between 1982 and 1992 are equipped with wood-fire heating.³

1.2.7 The nuclear power programme
It seems to us useful to include here a short commentary on the impact that the French nuclear power programme has had on energy management policy. In this regard it should be remembered that the launching of the nuclear power programme in 1974 was one of the reasons that weighed in favour of the creation of the energy conservation agency (Agence pour les Economies d'Energie) that same year. At the time the government wanted to show that it was not relying solely on a grand programme that was not accepted across the board, but that it also sought to promote energy conservation as espoused by the minority fraction of public opinion that was opposed to nuclear power.
But the existence of the nuclear power programme, which is a shining success in French energy policy, had three negative effects on our energy management policy:

• an "eviction" effect; the magnitude of investment devoted to nuclear power undoubtedly slowed down decisions for public investment in energy management;
• an excess-capacity effect which has durably diminished the economic advantage available in conserving electricity, and has even further obviated the motivation of EDF staff to act in favour of conservation;⁵
• a demotivating effect on public opinion which became convinced that our country possessed a clean and abundant central source of energy; public opinion has been less receptive to energy management than in countries that rejected nuclear power.