

A large earthquake centered off the coast of Sanriku occurred, at 2:46 p.m. on Friday, March 11, 2011. The seismic intensity of 7 on the Japanese earthquake scale was measured in Kurihara City, Miyagi Prefecture. This 9.0-magnitude earthquake was the biggest recorded in Japan since 1923 and the highest level in the world, equivalent to the 2010 Chili Earthquake (M8.8).

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Updated on March 31, 2023

Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Station
(NPS) Accident

Accident at the Nuclear Power Station




**Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)'s Fukushima Daiichi NPS
Unit 3 (shot from the air)**

(Shot on March 16, 2011; Provided by TEPCO)

Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)'s Fukushima Daiichi NPS Unit 1, 2 and 3, which were in operation at the time of the earthquake, lost all AC power due to the earthquake and subsequent tsunami. This led to the stop of the cooling system and loss of means to cool down nuclear fuels, eventually resulting in the melt of nuclear fuel. In the process of the melt, hydrogen gas was generated, and hydrogen gas accumulated in reactor buildings caused an explosion at Unit 1 on March 12 and at Unit 3 on March 14. Additionally, at Unit 4 adjacent to Unit 3, a hydrogen explosion occurred due to hydrogen gas that is considered to have flowed into it from Unit 3.

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Immediately after the earthquake, at Units 1, 2 and 3 at Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)'s Fukushima Daiichi NPS, which were in operation, all reactors were shut down automatically.


Even after reactors are shut down, it is necessary to remove the decay heat of core fuel. At the NPS, after external electrical power supply was lost due to the collapse of transmission line towers, etc., emergency diesel generators were automatically activated and procedures for normal cold shutdown were commenced.

However, the subsequent tsunamis hit the NPS and flooded those emergency diesel generators, switchboards and other equipment. All Units except for Unit 6 lost all AC power and cooling seawater pumps stopped functioning. Unit 1 thus lost all functions to cool down the reactor. While Units 2 and 3 continued cooling reactors for some time using the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) and the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI), respectively, which can work without AC power, these systems also stopped soon and both Units eventually lost the means to remove the decay heat of core fuel.

Under such circumstances, NPS staff worked to activate alternative coolant injection routes using fire pumps or other equipment at Units 1, 2 and 3, but partly due to the possibility of another tsunami hitting, until those alternative measures were commenced, reactor cores were left uncooled. Coolant injection is considered to have been suspended for around 14 hours at Unit 1 and for around 6.5 hours at Units 2 and 3. Additionally, many hidden bypasses in the alternative coolant injection system made it difficult to supply injected water effectively to the reactor cores for cooling, and the reactors went into meltdown.

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As coolant injection to the reactor core was suspended, the water level in the reactor declined and the fuel was exposed. This caused overheating of core fuel, triggered core melt and damaged a part of the pressure vessel. Melted fuel leaked from the pressure vessel into the inside of the containment vessel, and at the same time, cesium and other radioactive materials discharged from the fuel assembly was discharged within the containment vessel. Additionally, under high temperature due to core damage, steam and zirconium of the fuel cladding reacted to generate hydrogen, which was discharged within the containment vessel from the damaged part of the pressure vessel together with steam.

In the meantime, core damage increased the temperature and pressure in the containment vessel and deteriorated its confinement function, causing gaps in such parts as the penetrator that extends to the outside of the containment vessel. Radioactive materials discharged from such gaps to the outside of the containment vessel and diffused into the environment. Hydrogen generated due to the reaction of the steam and metal of the fuel cladding leaked through the gaps into the reactor building and accumulated there, and led to a hydrogen explosion.

Coolant injected into the reactor leaked from the pressure vessel and containment vessel and high-level radioactive-contaminated water accumulated underground below the reactor building and turbine building and partially flowed out into the ocean.

The damage to the pressure vessel and deterioration of the confinement function of the containment vessel caused a leak of steam containing radioactive materials. In addition, radioactive materials were also discharged into the air due to containment vessel vent operations, etc.

In this manner, radioactive materials were discharged into the environment in the forms of outflow of high-level contaminated water into the ocean and discharge of radioactive materials into the air.

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