As the emergency core cooling system stopped at Unit 1 and Unit 2 of Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)'s Fukushima Daiichi NPS, the government issued, based on the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency, a Declaration of a Nuclear Emergency Situation and established the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters at 19:03 p.m. on March 11, 2011.

The Secretariat of the Nuclear Regulation Authority

At 21:23 p.m. on the same day, based on the same Act, the government issued an evacuation order to residents within a 3-km radius of the NPS and ordered those within a 10-km radius to shelter indoors.


Thereafter, the government expanded the coverage of the evacuation order, which was targeted to residents within a 3-km radius of the NPS, to cover those within a 10-km radius. As a result, a total of 51,207 residents in four towns within a 10-km radius were placed under the evacuation order.

As a hydrogen explosion occurred within the reactor building at Unit 1 at 15:36 p.m. on March 12, the coverage of the evacuation order was further expanded from residents within a 10-km radius to those within a 20-km radius of the NPS.

(Related to p.106 of Vol. 2, "Designation of Areas under Evacuation Orders," and p.107 of Vol. 2, "Designation of Restricted Areas and Areas under Evacuation Orders and Removal Thereof")


Included in this reference material on March 31, 2013 Updated on March 31, 2019

Prepared by the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency



In the early morning of March 12, 2011, monitoring cars measured higher ambient dose rates within the premises of Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)'s Fukushima Daiichi NPS and the discharge of radioactive materials was first confirmed after the earthquake. At Unit 1, after an abnormal pressure rise in the containment vessel was observed, the pressure declined slightly. Therefore, it is considered that radioactive materials discharged from the containment vessel at Unit 1 and were discharged into the air. Thereafter, temporary rises of ambient dose rates were observed several times after the vent operations and explosions at the buildings. The highest ambient dose rate was measured at 9:00 a.m. on March 15. A monitoring car near the main gate measured the highest rate of approx. 12 mSv/h.

Included in this reference material on March 31, 2013 Updated on March 31, 2019



In accordance with the progress of events, fuel melted and radioactive materials was discharged from the pressure vessel to outside of the reactor. As a result of containment vessel vent operations and damage to reactor buildings, radioactive materials were discharged from the reactor core into the air. Vent operation at Unit 1 was considered to be successful as the pressure in the containment vessel declined at 14:30 p.m. on March 12. Due to the radioactive plume discharged at that time, an ambient dose rate of approx. 1 mSv/h was detected [(i) in the figure]. On March 13, the following day, the ambient dose rate clearly increased again [(ii) in the figure]. This is considered to have been caused by vent operation at Unit 3 conducted after the water level in the reactor declined and the fuel was exposed from cooling water. At 9:00 a.m. on March 15, the highest rate of approx. 12 mSv/h was observed [(iii) in the figure]. Early in the morning at around 6:00 a.m. of that day, the pressure of the pressure suppression chamber declined at Unit 2 with the sound of an explosion. Therefore, the high dose rate on March 15 is considered to have been caused by the discharge of radioactive materials from Unit 2.

Ambient dose rate increases were also measured at 23:00 p.m. on March 15 and at 12:00 p.m. on March 16 [(iv) and (v) in the figure]. Pressure decline in the containment vessel was observed in Unit 3 and Unit 2, respectively, and these ambient dose rate increases are considered to have been caused by the discharge of radioactive materials from Unit 3 and Unit 2.

Included in this reference material on March 31, 2013 Updated on March 31, 2022

	Scale	(INES)
	Level	Accident examples
TOTAL PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY	7 Major accident	Former Soviet Union: Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident (1986) Japan: Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)'s Fukushima Daiichi Nucle Power Station (NPS) accident (2011)
	6 Serious accident	Provisionally evaluated as Level 7 on April 12, 201
	5 Accident with wider consequences	UK: Windscale Nuclear Power Plant fire accident (1957) US: Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant accident (1979)
	4 Accident with local consequences	Japan: JCO criticality accident (1999) France: Saint-Laurent Nuclear Power Plant accident (1980)
	3 Serious incident	Spain: Fire at Vandellos Nuclear Power Plant (1989)
	2 Incident	Japan: Damage to steam generator heat exchanger tube at Unit 2, Mihama NPS (199) Japan: Workers' radiation exposure due to an accident of scattering nuclear fuel materials at the Fuel Research Building, Oarai Research & Development Institute (20)
	1 Anomaly	Japan: Sodium leak accident at Monju (1995) Japan: Primary coolant leak at Unit 2, Tsuruga NPS (1999) Japan: Pipe rupture in the residual heat removal system at Unit 1, Hamaoka NPS (200 Japan: Pipe failure in the secondary system at Unit 3, Mihama NPS (2004)
1	0 Below scale	(No safety significance)
	Not covered	(Events unrelated to safety)

The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) is the international indicator to show the level of the seriousness in terms of safety of accidents or trouble at nuclear power plants.

The accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi NPS was evaluated as Level 7 (radiation impact converted to the amount of I-131 exceeds several tens of thousands TBq (10¹⁶ Bq)), equivalent to the level of the Chernobyl NPS Accident.

(Related to p.28 of Vol. 1, "International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale")

Included in this reference material on March 31, 2013 Updated on March 31, 2019